New Delhi and Washington’s ongoing claims and counter claims over Russian oil exports to India

Russia is still exporting oil to India. At least that is what New Delhi – and Moscow - claim. Half a world away meanwhile, Washington has repeatedly announced that New Delhi is on the cusp of a clean break, something Indian officials have been far more cautious about as they stress diversification and energy security rather than outright cessation.

At the heart of the dispute lies a set of data with real economic heft. India, as one of the world’s largest crude importers and in recent years at least a major buyer of Russian crude, in the fiscal year to March 2025, saw Russia as its single largest oil supplier. Data suggests that roughly 1.76mn barrels per day (bpd) which made up around 36% of its total crude imports according to ship-tracking and energy data, arrived from Russia. This was an increase of 7.3% on Russian oil imports compared to the year before and came about primarily as a result of the discounts being offered by Moscow.

Overall, India’s total import portfolio that year averaged close to 4.9mn bpd, with the more traditional Middle East suppliers such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia falling behind Russia in terms of total volume shipped.

These figures alone demonstrate why the ongoing public dispute between New Delhi and Washington has gone beyond mere technicalities into something approaching oil-supply theatre. In Washington’s telling, India has repeatedly agreed to halt direct or indirect purchases of Russian crude as part of a wider trade and tariff deal.

When US President Donald Trump’s administration touted the lifting of punitive tariffs as a reward for such a shift, officials in Washington claimed – repeatedly but incorrectly it now appears - that India’s Russian crude imports were on the verge of stopping. Other claims based on Indian imports dropping from a mid-2025 peak of over 2mn bpd to just under half that were also seen as proof that New Delhi had given in to US pressure and was shifting away from Russian oil imports.

Yet Indian official responses in the past month have been particularly guarded. In one press briefing held in response to US comments, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri confirmed New Delhi’s overriding intent towards “maintaining multiple sources of energy supply”. In making this statement he effectively posited that any reductions in Russian oil imports would only be made as part of a broader diversification strategy rather than a capitulation to US tariffs pressure.

As such, contested Indian-US narratives have caused a great deal of confusion depending upon the source. In recent days, Reuters reporting indicates that Indian state refiners such as Indian Oil Corporation, Bharat Petroleum and Reliance Industries have now declined trader offers for Russian crude for an April 2026 delivery date. While this does suggest a slowdown of sorts for now with trade negotiations it does not signal any form of abrupt stop.

Moreover, crude import statistics show that Russian oil flows remain significant to New Delhi. India’s imports of Russian crude, which hit a multi-month low in December 2025 in dollar terms at around $2.7bn, have since bounced back according to Kpler and trade data. Reuters reports that in January 2026 India was still importing around 1.2mn bpd of Russian crude – a marked decline from the peak, but still far from the zero claimed by the US.

To this end, while India appears to be reducing its dependency on Russian crude it is not eliminating it wholesale. It is correct to say that Indian refiners have been actively purchasing barrels from elsewhere, including Venezuelan crude recently bought by IOC and HPCL for delivery later in 2026, but this is a sign that New Delhi is simply broadening its supply base as it originally claimed.

In addition, there are a number of technical and economic reasons why a sudden stop is unlikely. Primarily this centres on the fact that Russia’s Urals grade crude has historically been sold at discounts relative to Middle Eastern and US benchmarks – a significant factor for India. Refining infrastructure on the subcontinent is also tailored to heavy, sour crudes like those from Russia and Venezuela, making these supplies economically more attractive even as Washington encourages alternative sources.

These nuances are lost in much of the rhetorical sparring as Washington ties the narrative of India stopping purchases outright to the wider sanctions regime imposed on Russia.

In Delhi and Moscow meanwhile, officials have pushed back against any concept that India is moving away from its longstanding energy deals with Russia, stressing the fact that New Delhi’s position has always been that supply decisions will be driven by India’s national interest as well as market conditions.

What results is a reflection of India’s size and energy hunger – that New Delhi is willing to rebalance, but not repudiate.