Beware the bear as Moscow woos Asia with oil and atoms

Russia’s position in Asia is stronger when measured in refineries, reactor contracts and established relationships than in diplomatic declarations. Across South, Southeast and East Asia, Moscow wants customers, investment opportunities and political room to manoeuvre.

Yet its growing reliance on the region exposes an uncomfortable distinction: owning commercially valuable assets does not necessarily give Russia influence over the governments hosting them.

India illustrates both sides. Rosneft’s 49.13% holding in Nayara Energy gives Russia a substantial interest in Indian refining, rather than merely access to an export destination. That ownership in turn connects Russian production with processing capacity inside a major consuming economy and global geopolitical rival.

However, as IntelliNews reported on sanctions disrupting Nayara’s exports, an overseas foothold can become a point of vulnerability when restrictions affect shipping and end customers. Commercial presence brings exposure as well as opportunity.

The wider Indian relationship therefore resists easy characterisation as a Russian strategic victory. Refiners have long had strong reasons to purchase attractively priced crude, but their decisions also reflect access to other suppliers and the consequences of American pressure. Reporting on Indian purchasing decisions in February showed companies seeking government guidance while Russian supplies continued. Moscow benefits from this Indian demand but it cannot and should not assume that commercial pragmatism amounts to an enduring political commitment.

Atomic influence

Nuclear power meanwhile offers a different prospect. Intellinews’ sister publication NewsBase reporting in the past year highlights Russian ambitions to extend relationships through fuel and servicing arrangements lasting decades.

Unlike a cargo of crude, a reactor requires sustained technical cooperation. Coverage by Newsbase of Russia’s nuclear expansion identifies projects in Bangladesh, China and India. The strategic attraction is clear: construction can establish relationships that continue through financing, training, maintenance and fuel supply. Host governments nevertheless retain their own interests and choices. It is in this regard that Moscow struggles to gain a foothold.

Bangladesh is key to demonstrating why that qualification matters. Russian financing of Rooppur in the east of the country gives Moscow an important role in national electricity infrastructure, but cooperation has survived political upheaval through adjustment rather than unquestioned loyalty. IntelliNews’ examination of relations after Bangladesh’s 2024 uprising describes Moscow cultivating contacts beyond its longstanding partners.

For Russia, preserving access across changes of government is itself an ambition and one it has thus far done well to achieve. For Dhaka, maintaining a useful supplier need not mean accepting Moscow’s wider international agenda.

ASEAN

Southeast Asia presents even greater scope for expansion, alongside a larger gap between agreements and completed investments. Vietnam’s revived nuclear programme offers Russia a route into infrastructure serving future electricity demand. IntelliNews reported this week that Hanoi and Moscow signed an intergovernmental agreement in March covering two VVER-1200 units at Ninh Thuan 1. While that is a significant commitment, an agreement to build must remain distinct from an operating asset for Hanoi. Timetables, costs and implementation will determine its eventual value.

Myanmar reveals a still more ambitious search for opportunities on the part of the Kremlin. August’s talks in the Russian capital covered LNG, nuclear generation and port development, with Inter RAO involved in proposals associated with Dawei. Moscow plainly sees potential to connect energy supplies with industrial and maritime infrastructure. Yet proposals for a refinery, terminal or power station cannot be counted as established Russian holdings. Their strategic significance depends on whether financing, security and construction permit the plans to advance beyond negotiations.

East Asia is where Moscow has largely failed to establish itself as a regional ‘influencer’ except for on a purely transactional basis despite long claiming links to Beijing and Pyongyang, and thus exposes the limits most sharply. China offers an enormous market, but negotiations over additional pipeline supplies demonstrate Beijing’s bargaining power. September reporting said the proposed additional route still lacked a supply contract.

North Korea, meanwhile, supplies military support, turning partnership into a reciprocal wartime necessity as and when needed.

Russia’s regional ambition across much of Asia is therefore substantial but uneven: durable commercial connections exist where possible, political support where available, and alternatives to Western markets throughout, but Moscow’s success should be judged by functioning investments and dependable revenues, rather than announcements alone.

Asia provides Russia with opportunities to remain economically engaged even if the terms increasingly depend on what Asian partners themselves require.