BEYOND THE BOSPORUS: Why Azerbaijan’s official news agency lifted lid on Turkey’s hidden trade with Israel

When state news agency of Azerbaijan APA this week published an investigative report detailing voyages completed by cargo ships from Turkey to Israel, a delicate geopolitical nerve took a direct hit. 

The October 6 article, headlined “456 ship voyages from Turkey to Israel: The unseen side of ‘zero trade,’” was a direct challenge to official assertions from Ankara that Turkey’s commercial ties with Israel have been completely frozen. Drawing on Automatic Identification System (AIS) vessel-tracking data, the Azerbaijani Press Agency investigation mapped out persistent flows of cargo across the Eastern Mediterranean.

Flags of convenience

APA’s findings showed that six foreign-flagged container ships linked to Turkish operators, namely Medkon Ltf, Medkon Canakkale, Medkon Mersin, Admiral Mars, Aadmiral Star and Anita A, made 11 port calls at Israeli cities Ashdod and Haifa between September 17 and September 30 alone. In all, 456 direct voyages from Turkish ports to Israeli ports took place between January and September 2025, the APA report claimed.

The vessels reportedly carried Panamanian and Liberian flags of convenience, but information from corporate registry databases linked the management of the vessels back to Turkish maritime enterprises.

"What were these ships carrying and who were the ultimate counterparties?" the media outlet asked, framing the trade as starkly contradicting Ankara’s public stance on Turkish trade with Israel.

Article quietly vanished

The horse had bolted – but within hours of publication, the article quietly vanished. Azerbaijani, English and Russian versions of the report were deleted, without any retraction or explanation. Readers attempting to access the report were directed back to APA’s homepage.

The lifespan of the report in public circulation may have been brief, but it was enough to highlight rare, but brewing, diplomatic frictions between Turkey and Azerbaijan, two nations long bound by a somewhat sacred foreign policy doctrine: "One nation, two states."

Turkey’s government even includes the slogan in official publications outlining legislation and in directives published in its Official Gazette.

‘Know your place’

The timing of the release of the APA report was not at all coincidental. It arrived in the public eye just four days after Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev, delivered a fiery address at the 8th Congress of his ruling New Azerbaijan Party on October 2. Without explicitly naming foreign powers, Aliyev launched a sharply worded rebuke against external interference.

"Everyone should know their place, stay out of our affairs, stop poking their noses into our lifestyle and refrain from lecturing us," the Azerbaijani leader of 22 years declared.

Aliyev forcefully asserted his country’s foreign policy independence, pointedly revisiting Baku’s 2020 victory over the Armenians in retrieving territory in Nagorno-Karabakh.

"Whatever we achieved, we purchased with our own money," he said, emphasising that all military equipment used in the conflict was procured at market rates.

In Ankara, Aliyev’s rhetoric was widely interpreted as a quiet dismissal of claims by Turkey’s leader of 23 years, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as regards decisive military backing provided to Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh war.

The mention of "our lifestyle" was similarly seen as a reference to a recent pushback made by Turkish conservative circles over secular dress code regulations introduced in Azerbaijani schools.

Crucially, APA put forward its report on the Turkish-Israeli shipping as a required retort to what it labelled "black propaganda" emanating from Turkey on Azerbaijan’s close strategic and energy ties with West Jerusalem.

Turkey’s unwanted ‘big brother’ act

Turkey’s state insists on not understanding that no state or non-state actor in the world desires a ‘big brother’, particularly one that is a middle power that itself operates under a hegemon. There is no misunderstanding here. Ankara made the same mistake in relation to the Turkic states in the 1990s, and it still insists on ‘Big Brothering’, not only in Central Asia but also around the Middle East and North Africa.

When it comes to trade with Israel, the Azerbaijanis have obviously forgotten that they meet around half of Israel’s crude oil consumption via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.

The third section of the pipeline – running from the border of Turkey and Georgia to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the eastern Mediterranean coast – is operated by Turkish government-run pipeline operations monopoly Botas.

Azerbaijan takes part in an open alliance with Israel. Turkey, on the other hand, keeps remaining economic relations with Israel in the shadows, while indulging in carefully controlled wars of words with the Israelis and championing anti-Israel rhetoric in the media.

Looking at the hardline rule pursued by Aliyev, the thinking is often that he aims to keep his population, who are mainly Shia, in common with the people of neighbouring Iran, away from Iranian influence, while presenting himself as an independent actor in the world arena who defends the Azerbaijani way of life and sovereignty.

The questioning of Aliyev’s Israel policy by Turkish government trolls and media can ordinarily be brushed off. However, if the Shia people of Azerbaijan start questioning why their country is supporting Israel rather than their Shia brothers in Iran, Aliyev could have some problems. It is particularly northern Iran, which borders Azerbaijan, that is populated by ethnic Turks, or Azeris.

All in all, there is no visible indication of any sharp deterioration in Turkey-Azerbaijan relations, but Aliyev has at least provided the media purveyors of international relations with some good fodder.