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Bone-chilling threat to US issued by successor to assassinated Iranian general

Esmail Ghaani served as Deputy Commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Quds Force from 1997 until he was made Commander after the assassination of Soleimani.
Esmail Ghaani served as Deputy Commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Quds Force from 1997 until he was made Commander after the assassination of Soleimani.

A bone-chilling threat to the US was on January 3 issued by the successor to assassinated Iranian general Qasem Soleimani. “We tell everyone, be patient and see the dead bodies of Americans all over the Middle East,” Esmail Ghaani, the incoming commander of Iran’s Quds Force, was quoted as saying by al-Jazeera.

The likelihood of the US experiencing the vengeance vowed by the Islamic Republic’s leadership in the wake of the Donald Trump-ordered drone strike that killed Soleimani as he travelled in a vehicle leaving Baghdad airport was underlined by Robert Baer, a former CIA officer, who was cited by the Guardian as saying: “I frankly have never seen the Iranians not respond—tit for tat. It’s just never happened. It’s so in their DNA, [as is using] a proxy, which makes it more difficult to respond to. And their options are unlimited.”

Trump may have thrown red meat to his base by authorising a missile hit that has taken out the man widely regarded in Iran as second only to the supreme leader in the country’s approach to Middle East affairs, but if bodybags start coming home in his re-election year things might take on a different complexion. In explaining the assassination, Trump described Soleimani as “the number one terrorist anywhere in the world,” and claimed the 62-year-old general was planning “imminent and sinister” attacks on US diplomats and personnel (this prompted a New York Times report that Trump administration officials have provided no specific details of what they said were imminent threats, and that some US Defense Department officials said they knew of only generalised threats that did not appear to be imminent).

Charismatic head of armed forces

However, Soleimani was popular in Iran as the charismatic head of Iran’s most important conventional armed forces. Although he had plenty of blood on his hands, including that of hundreds of US soldiers killed in Iraq by Iranian proxies, there is no way that Tehran—which says it has no choice but to back friendly political groups and militias across Middle East conflict zones to defend its national interests, just as other nations in the region do—will regard him as having been a legitimate target on the basis of “counter-terrorism” targeting. In its struggle to make progress at the negotiating table with Iran, the Barack Obama administration, for instance, saw Soleimani—the mastermind behind Iran’s successful moves in the past two decades to substantially control the destinies of Iraq and Syria and a figure who once mocked Trump as a “gambler” and derided him for “language [that] belongs to nightclubs”—as somewhat untouchable.

Charlie Sykes, founder and editor-at-large of the Bulwark website, warned on Twitter: “[Trump’s unleashed something he’s not able to control. This is the problem with a president who plays Whac-A-Mole rather than chess. I don’t think he’s thought through the long-term implications of this.”

“Short term, this will help Trump because it plays to his image of being strong and decisive, and it distracts from impeachment,” Sykes added. “He is, in effect, creating a resumé of dead terrorists he can point to on the campaign trail and say we’re winning again, we’re strong, nobody messes with America before.”

The de facto leader of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, a close Suleimani associate, was also killed in the drone strike, described as an “illegal action” by Moscow among others. 

At an “Evangelicals for Trump” rally in Miami on January 3, Trump said: “We are a peace loving nation. My administration remains committed to establishing peace and harmony. We do not seek war, we do not seek nation building.”

Trump’s commitment to finding peace and harmony with Iran will of course be sorely tested once the form of the Iranian response to the assassinations is known.

Analysts weigh up impacts

IHS Markit Middle East analyst Ege Seckin and director Firas Modad, released a note on the killing of Soleimani and how it impacts Iran, the US and their relationship.

Seckin and Modad concluded: “Soleimani’s absence will certainly weaken, but not destroy, Iran’s ability to project asymmetric power in the region, which had relied on Soleimani’s masterful management of regional proxies and allies. His absence will also risk Iran becoming far less subtle in its actions, raising the risk of a miscalculation leading to all-out war. His replacement, his former deputy Ismail Qaani, is unlikely to be able to replicate Soleimani’s sophistication, but is nonetheless likely to opt for continued confrontation with the US.”

They added: “In Iraq, militias such as Badr, Kataib Hizbullah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq are very likely to intensify attacks using IEDs [improvised explosive devices], rockets and small-arms fire against US bases and energy assets, with the intent of maximising casualties rather than merely sending a message, as had been the case heretofore. Iran’s retaliation is likely to be gradual, with a string of attacks in and outside the region, rather than a one-off.

“As a lower risk option, Iran is also likely to conduct attacks, sometimes attributed to the Houthi, against energy, desalination, maritime and aviation assets in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, using cruise missiles and weaponised UAVs. Unlike attacks between May and September 2019, given the willingness of the US to strike such a high-level Iranian target, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are more likely to be emboldened to respond against Iran if they are attacked, raising the risk of escalation and full-scale confrontation. Meanwhile Iran will likely seek to raise the financial and military costs of support for any US involvement in the region.

“Iran is additionally likely to respond against US troops and personnel globally. Iran’s capability is likely to be highest in Western Europe, including Germany, France, Sweden and the UK, Latin America, including Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay, Australia and West Africa.

“Its response is almost certain to include an increased effort to force the US out of Iraq through legal means, relying on the Iraqi government and Parliament, who will be under far more pressure to comply. Iran and its allies are also likely to provoke the US into responding violently and inflicting Iraqi casualties. The US is more likely to respond to Iran forcefully, particularly in Iraq and Syria, raising the risk of further escalation.”

Looking at US strategy, Seckin and Modad said: “The assassination took place while multiple mediations between Iran and the US, via Switzerland, Oman and Japan, were underway. The US likely still prefers to negotiate with Iran, albeit on its own terms, which are unattainable without regime change. The killing shows the US intent to confront Iran head-on to force it to come to terms, this time militarily rather than just economically.

“It is unclear if the assassination reflects the complete failure of negotiations, US frustration and inability to turn the tide against Iran, or the US’ assessment that Soleimani’s activities were an insurmountable obstacle to successful negotiations, and that more pressure was needed before negotiations succeed. In any case, Iran is almost certain to retaliate, bringing about further escalation.”