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Russia emerges as 'strategic energy partner' for Global South thanks to Iran

Moscow's foreign ministry is rushing to take advantage of removal of sanctions on its energy exports while the Hormuz remains effectively closed.
Moscow's foreign ministry is rushing to take advantage of removal of sanctions on its energy exports while the Hormuz remains effectively closed.

Russian energy exports have surged in value and demand since the Iran war began on February 28, with Moscow moving to lock in new buyers across Asia and the Global South as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on Gulf infrastructure trigger the worst energy supply shock in decades, state media reported.

Russian oil prices hit a 13-year high in the days before the US-Iran ceasefire on April 7. Though Brent crude fell 14% to $93.60 a barrel on the truce announcement, it remains well above the roughly $70 level before the war, and the structural shift in trade flows may prove more durable than the fighting itself. 

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Russia was receiving "an enormous number of requests to purchase its energy resources from alternative directions" but was negotiating to ensure "the situation best serves Moscow's interests." The days of $59-a-barrel Russian crude sold at deep discounts to India and China appear to be over.

Russia is not limiting its push to crude oil. Bloomberg reported on April 9 that Moscow was offering LNG from its US-sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 and Portovaya facilities to South Asian buyers at 40% below spot prices, using intermediaries in China and Russia. The sellers offered paperwork to disguise the cargoes as originating from Oman or Nigeria.

The offers target a market in crisis. The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian strikes on Qatar's Ras Laffan complex, the world's largest LNG export plant, have removed roughly a fifth of global gas supply. Qatari shipments have stopped entirely, forcing Bangladesh, which sourced 60% of its LNG from Qatar in 2025, to buy on the spot market at double the cost of its long-term contracts. Both Bangladesh and India have cut gas to the fertiliser sector.

India has traditionally avoided sanctioned Russian energy but purchased its first Iranian oil since 2019 after a US Treasury general licence waived restrictions last month. A recent visit by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov was described in Indian media as a diplomatic event of the first order, with Russia the only country guaranteeing growing deliveries of both energy and fertilisers. Russian fertiliser shipments to India have risen 40% in recent weeks.

The courtship extends well beyond India. Vietnam now describes Russia as "its most important and reliable partner in Europe." ASEAN has publicly thanked Moscow for "readiness to save the regional bloc from the oil crisis." Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia have all sought closer energy ties, while Gulf states that were previously buying Russian crude quietly are now doing so with less concern for Western disapproval.

The geopolitical logic is straightforward. Russia is one of very few major energy exporters whose supply routes do not pass through the Strait of Hormuz or depend on Gulf infrastructure. Its oil moves by pipeline to China and by tanker from Baltic and Arctic ports. Its gas flows to Europe via the remaining TurkStream pipeline and to Asia as LNG from Arctic and Pacific terminals. None of these routes are affected by the Iran war.

For Moscow, the war has turned Western sanctions from a constraint into an advantage. Countries that previously hesitated to buy Russian energy for fear of US secondary sanctions now face a choice between sanctioned Russian crude at a discount or no crude at all. The Iran war has effectively given Russia a second customer base beyond China, which until now was the only major buyer of its sanctioned LNG.

The question is whether this lasts. If the two-week ceasefire agreed on April 7 holds and leads to a permanent settlement at Islamabad talks starting April 10, Gulf exports will eventually resume and the premium on Russian supply will narrow.

The ceasefire looks fragile. Iran says three of its 10 conditions have already been violated it even deleted its tweet about going to the meeting on April 9. Israel says the truce does not cover Lebanon; Lebanon just wants to be left alone. US Joint Chiefs Chairman General Dan Caine described the pause as "small." Iranian drones and missiles struck Kuwait, the UAE and Saudi Arabia on the same day the ceasefire took effect, while suspected UAE aircraft hit Iran (are they still at war?).

Russia's Deputy Security Council Chairman Dmitry Medvedev offered his own assessment. "The European Russophobe sheep will have to live in strict austerity for a long time. Because there will be no cheap oil," he wrote.

Even if peace returns to the Gulf, the structural damage to buyer confidence in Middle Eastern supply chains may take years to repair. Insurance premiums for Gulf shipping will remain elevated. Companies that relocated operations to Istanbul or Singapore will not rush back. And countries that discovered Russia as a reliable supplier during the crisis may not easily be persuaded to give it up.