TEHRAN BLOG: Why a Trump win may not be good for Israel

The outcome of the US presidential election on November 5 remains too close to call, but the prospect of a second term for Republican candidate Donald Trump term is prompting careful reassessments among America’s partners in the Middle East. If Trump were to win re-election, his administration's policy towards the region may be different than many expect, and it could have counter-intuitive consequences.

During his first term, Trump’s strong support for Israel and a close relationship with Israeli premier Benjamin Netanyahu’s were defining features, leading  to his recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and his facilitation of the Abraham Accords, which normalised Israel's relations with several Arab nations.

However, in light of the October 7 Hamas-led incursion into Israel – which caused 1,200 Israeli deaths and led to Israeli retaliation that has killed more than 43,000 Palestinians and Lebanese – the path to rapprochement with key Arab players such as Saudi Arabia may now have significantly narrowed. 

Within Israel, some fear that the unwavering support extended by the Biden administration has damaged the United States’ standing in several Arab capitals, which could complicate Israel's drive for long-term security.

Moreover, while many observers assume a second Trump term would follow the same pro-Israel trajectory,  Trump’s unpredictability presents unique challenges. Trump has a record of transactional diplomacy, marked by unexpected moves, which could be challenging for Israel and  Netanyahu. As one former Israeli defence official warned, “Trump’s expectations from allies can change overnight, especially if public opinion or domestic agendas start demanding different priorities.”

Trump's approach to foreign policy also demands reciprocal gains, a concept that may place Israel’s reliance on substantial US military aid under a new level of scrutiny. Since October 2023, US military aid to Israel has totalled $17.9bn, raising concerns among American taxpayers and policymakers about its sustainability, especially as domestic priorities compete for attention.

Critics argue that this high level of support could become a heavy financial burden, especially if Trump’s base pushes for America-first policies that favour reducing international expenses. As one Israeli analyst remarked to Israeli media Haaretz, "It’s a different time in Washington now; economic and political pressures mean that traditional allies cannot expect a blank cheque from the White House anymore, no matter who is in office"

Arab Gulf States Chart an Independent Path

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries – which include Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman – have historically enjoyed strong ties with the US, viewing it as a key ally for security and economic development. Republican administrations in particular are generally seen as more favourable to the Gulf states’ interests, with their focus on security and less emphasis on human rights, which some GCC nations perceive as interference in their domestic affairs. In contrast, Democratic administrations are viewed as advocating swift transitions to renewable energy, which could pose challenges for the oil-dependent economies of the Gulf. 

However, the first Trump administration's hardline stance against Iran prompted some Gulf states to question the extent of their alignment with US policies, particularly as they explore deeper relationships with other global powers, including China and Russia with BRICS. This has been reinforced by the Biden adminstration's support for Israel's invasion of Gaza and attacks on Lebanon, despite occasional hand wringing.

Nations such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have anyway in recent years begun charting a more independent course, stepping away from the U.S. security umbrella that has protected the region for decades. Both countries have shown a willingness to engage with the Russian-led BRICS bloc, though their formal membership remains pending. This shift is a signal to the West that the Gulf is no longer exclusively bound to U.S. policy objectives.

A Saudi foreign policy analyst recently noted on Arab language media, “Our region is pursuing multipolarity; we recognise that diversifying alliances means we can retain our sovereignty and make decisions that serve our own interests, not just those of Washington”. This sentiment has reverberated across Gulf capitals, where leaders appear cautious about committing too closely to any single power in a rapidly changing global landscape.

Iran sees opportunities in a Trump victory

Paradoxically, Iran’s leadership expresses cautious optimism about a potential Trump victory. Despite the “maximum pressure” campaign during Trump’s first term—which included the withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal and the imposition of stringent sanctions—Tehran now perceives a second Trump term as an opportunity. Iran is reportedly exploring the idea of a new negotiation with Trump, hopeful that his preference for signature deals could open a path for a revised agreement.

A source close to the Iranian foreign ministry revealed to bne IntelliNews, “Unlike last time, Tehran wants to fully understand Trump’s requirements before any potential negotiations. We have learnt from the previous administration that clarity is essential in dealing with Washington”. The source mentioned that Iran is using intermediaries, including Oman and Qatar, to pass messages to Washington as the election looms.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, addressing the nation on November 4, issued a warning of “full-scale economic warfare” ahead. Speaking at an event for participants in a dryland farming scheme, Pezeshkian underscored Iran’s focus on economic resilience to counter sanctions.

“Our military strength ensures we will not be defeated through conventional warfare, as our enemies well know,” he remarked, with the Iranian rial recently falling to a historic low of IRR700,000 against the US dollar. “It is remarkable that the West speaks of human rights while supporting those who deny Palestinians access to food, water, and medicine,” he added, stressing that Iran’s missile programme remains purely defensive.

A former Iranian cabinet minister recently commented on the potential reaction of some Arab states to a Trump presidency. Speaking to Fararu, Ali Janati, former minister of culture under Hassan Rouhani, warned that renewed US pressure on Tehran might find favour among some Arab governments. Janati criticised the current Iranian government for missing critical opportunities to alleviate sanctions through nuclear diplomacy. “The Barjam (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) was ready for revival, but the administration’s inaction cost us essential European support,” he noted, lamenting missed chances for diplomatic progress.

Reflecting on Iran’s foreign policy missteps, Janati added, “Our current administration assumed it could negotiate better terms but ended up losing even the modest concessions we had under the Rouhani government.”

A Trump presidency could therefore reshape Middle Eastern geopolitics but perhaps not in the way that is expected. Trump may demand payback from Netanyahu for US support, while Israel's close association with Trump might further alienate it from other regional players, and Iran, now open to negotiation, may see opportunities in the coming shifts—potentially putting Israel’s “special status” up for the highest bid.