Venezuela’s oil billions expose the price of US control

Trump has deflected questions about $13bn that is missing

WHAT Almost $13bn of Venezuelan oil proceeds has not been accounted for

WHY The public accounting is opaque, or non-existent

WHAT NEXT A formal probe could be set up if Democrats win a house in the US congress in November

The Trump administration’s refusal to provide a clear account of more than $13bn in Venezuelan oil revenue is becoming increasingly difficult to defend.

Nearly seven months after US forces captured Nicolás Maduro, Washington can describe the controls surrounding the money but still cannot—or will not—publish a comprehensive account of where it is held, how much has been released and who authorised each payment.

That is no minor administrative omission. Oil is Venezuela’s principal source of export revenue, and control of the proceeds gives Washington extraordinary influence over the country’s government, economy and foreign relations. The arrangement may formally leave the money in Venezuelan ownership, but in practice Caracas cannot spend it without US consent.

Donald Trump did little to dispel the uncertainty when questioned aboard Air Force One recently. Instead of identifying the accounts or providing a breakdown of expenditure, the US president appeared to portray Venezuela’s oil income as compensation for American costs.

“$13bn from Venezuela? I think more than that… We’ve paid for that war many times over. And that’s going to happen with Iran, too. We’ve paid for the war many times over,” Trump said, according to Venezuelan newspaper El Nacional.

Pressed again, he shifted from the location of the money to the improved relationship between Washington and Caracas.

“No other president can say that for a long time. Who was the last president who could say that? So we had a cost to Venezuela. We’ve paid for that many times over. And now, as you know, we have a very good relationship with Venezuela.”

Trump later said the funds were being used to “run the country” and suggested some could be allocated to the military, subject to congressional approval. He also claimed that the US was taking “trillions and trillions of dollars from Venezuela”, without explaining the figure.

The answers highlighted the central problem: the administration appears unable to maintain a consistent distinction between holding Venezuela’s money in custody, managing it on Venezuela’s behalf and treating it as a financial return for US intervention.

Custody without clarity

Washington assumed control of Venezuelan oil exports following Maduro’s capture on January 3 and the installation of Delcy Rodríguez as interim president. US officials say billions of dollars have since been released to pay state employees, purchase oil-sector equipment and cover other government expenses.

Yet the public evidence remains strikingly thin. A website established by the Rodríguez administration to track the proceeds records only one transfer—a $300mn payment received in March.

Different US officials have offered fragments of information, but those fragments do not yet amount to a transparent accounting system.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Congress in June that KPMG was continuously auditing both the crude sales and expenditure. He also said the money was held at Citibank.

“It’s an ongoing audit, so it’s not a once-a-year audit, it’s on every expenditure, every single disbursement is audited by KPMG,” Rubio said, according to CNBC.

That would suggest a rigorous process. But the existence and scope of the audit have not been independently verified, and the administration has not published its results.

The account’s reported location has also changed. Energy Secretary Chris Wright said in February that $500mn from Venezuelan oil sales had been deposited in Qatar in an account controlled by the Trump administration. He later said a US Treasury account had been established instead.

In April, State Department official Michael Kozak said about $3bn had been withdrawn to cover Venezuelan expenses. That is substantially more than the single $300mn transfer appearing on the Venezuelan government’s online public tracker.

There may be legitimate explanations for the discrepancy. Money could be paid directly to suppliers or allocated through channels that do not appear as transfers to Caracas. But without a transaction-level account, it is impossible to determine whether the conflicting figures reflect different definitions, incomplete disclosure or funds that Venezuela has yet to receive.

Trump’s January executive order states that Venezuela retains ownership of the money and that the US merely has custody of it. If so, the administration should be able to show precisely how its custodial duties are being exercised. Ownership means little if the owner cannot access the funds, see complete accounts or independently verify their use.

Earthquakes sharpen the contradiction

The lack of transparency has become more consequential since two earthquakes struck Venezuela on June 24. The UN estimates that the disaster caused $37bn in damage to buildings and infrastructure.

Rodríguez has sought access to Venezuelan assets held overseas, while Washington has made just $386mn available for disaster relief. Against more than $13bn in oil revenue reportedly collected and tens of billions of dollars in reconstruction needs, that allocation raises an unavoidable question: whose priorities determine how Venezuela’s own income is spent?

The country’s weaker-than-expected economic recovery adds to the uncertainty. Higher oil production and export earnings might ordinarily be expected to provide a significant stimulus. Instead, growth has disappointed some economists.

Francisco Rodríguez, a senior research fellow at the Center for Economic and Policy Research, told the Financial Times that the performance could indicate Washington has not transferred all the additional revenue to Caracas. It does not prove that funds have been withheld improperly, but reinforces the need for full disclosure.

Lawmakers from both US parties are now demanding more information about the collection, storage and distribution of the proceeds. Some Democrats have signalled that they could investigate if they win control of congress in November’s midterm elections. The pressure could intensify further because the $13bn estimate excludes mining revenue that US officials say the administration is also collecting.

PDVSA displaced

The financial controversy is inseparable from a more fundamental transformation of Venezuela’s oil industry. Former Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) president Rafael Ramírez estimates that the country exported 187.1mn barrels in the first half of 2026, or approximately 1mn bpd, generating about $14.3bn.

But PDVSA, historically the institution responsible for selling Venezuelan crude, is no longer conducting the trade. Ramírez said private companies licensed by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) are marketing the oil instead.

Chevron, Vitol and Trafigura handled an estimated 77% of exports, with other OFAC-authorised businesses accounting for the remainder.

“None of the exports are under PDVSA’s trading and supply operations. PDVSA no longer exports,” Ramírez said.

That shift matters because it transfers control over Venezuela’s commercial relationships away from its state oil company and towards businesses operating with Washington’s permission. The US has consequently acquired influence over not merely the proceeds but also who can sell the crude and where it goes.

Ramírez estimated that Merey 16, Venezuela’s principal export grade, fetched about $92 a barrel during a period in which Brent traded between $72 and $120 amid the Persian Gulf war.

“Nobody knows anything about the management of these funds. The only certainty is that they are managed from the United States,” he said.

His trade figures illustrate how decisively the market has been reordered. The US received around 65% of Venezuelan exports in the first half of 2026, or 120mn barrels. Asia took 23%, mainly through India, while Europe accounted for 10%. Caribbean and Central American countries received the balance.

China’s position collapsed particularly sharply: shipments fell from 23mn barrels in December 2025 to nothing in April. Cuba received no Venezuelan crude, breaking with a supply policy maintained since 2002.

US interests

These changes support Ramírez’s contention that the oil trade now reflects “the commercial and geopolitical interests of the United States”. His description of Venezuela as operating under a “tutela”, or guardianship, government is politically loaded, but it captures the imbalance at the heart of the arrangement.

Washington controls access to the revenue, licenses the companies selling the oil and has helped redirect exports towards the US and away from China and Cuba. Rodríguez’s government may administer Venezuela, but its financial room for manoeuvre is constrained by decisions taken in Washington.

Ramírez’s estimates cannot be tested against comprehensive official industry statistics because the Venezuelan government has not published them. Caracas therefore shares responsibility for the information vacuum. But Washington now exercises the decisive control, and with that control comes the greater obligation to account for the money.