Iran ramps up Jask exports, but still heavily reliant on Kharg Island

Iran has increased loadings from its Jask terminal, but the port remains a supplement rather than a substitute for Kharg Island, the country’s main oil export hub. For executives watching supply risk in the Gulf, the message is clear: Tehran has built an outlet beyond Hormuz, but the bulk of its crude still moves through a far more exposed system.

Synmax Intelligence said two very large crude carriers, each capable of carrying about 2mn barrels, were seen loading at Jask within 15 days of one another. Kpler data, cited by TradeWinds showed loadings had resumed by March 10, including a 2mn-barrel cargo onto an unidentified VLCC, yet late-March tracking still put more than 84% of Iran’s exports from Kharg, with Jask accounting for only 4.4% and another 10% coming from Soroush and South Pars.

Jask matters because it sits outside the Strait of Hormuz and was designed to reduce Iran’s reliance on the chokepoint. Commissioned in 2021, it is linked to the 1,000km Goreh-Jask pipeline and was built with a nominal loading capacity of 1mn bpd and 20mn barrels of storage. However, capacity is closer to 350,000 bpd, with only one single-buoy mooring in service and the storage tanks only part complete.

That leaves Jask useful, but limited. The terminal can handle heavy crude, light crude and condensates, yet it is still operating well below design capacity. The result is that Iran can diversify the marginal barrel, but not yet replace Kharg at scale.

Kharg Island remains the backbone of Iran’s oil system. Reuters said it accounts for about 90% of the country’s oil exports, and Iranian media quoted Moussa Ahmadi, head of parliament’s energy commission, as saying that exports from the island have recently increased rather than fallen. That is significant because Kharg has long been viewed as both strategic and vulnerable, and it was targeted by the US in March, although oil infrastructure itself was spared.

The island’s resilience helps explain why Iran has continued to prioritise it. J.P. Morgan noted in March that Iran’s exports could stall and production could be halved only if the US and Israel were to seize Kharg and sustain major attacks. In other words, the island is not only central to volumes; it is central to Iran’s bargaining power.

For oil buyers and shipowners, the export pattern matters more than the symbolism. Jask shows that Iran has created an alternative route for some cargoes if Hormuz becomes harder to use, but the latest data suggest that route is still peripheral. Kharg’s continuing dominance means any serious disruption there would still hit most Iranian exports first.

That is why Tehran’s messaging has been so defensive. Iranian officials have warned that the US may be preparing a ground attack and have cautioned against any move on one of Iran’s islands. At the same time, Trump has threatened to destroy Kharg if a deal to end the war is not reached and Hormuz does not reopen immediately. Those threats reinforce the market’s focus on Iran’s export infrastructure as a live geopolitical risk, not a theoretical one.

The key takeaway is that Iran has improved its optionality, but not its immunity. Jask can absorb some of the strain if Kharg is threatened, and late-March data show it is doing so. Yet the island terminal still handles only a small fraction of total exports, so the system remains heavily concentrated around Kharg.

For energy executives, that concentration keeps Iranian supply vulnerable to military escalation, even as Tehran invests in redundancy. Jask is a hedge; Kharg is still the engine.